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State v. Gravette: Is There Justice for Incompetent
Defendants in North Carolina?
Beginning in the 1960s, efforts to reform the nation's mental health care
system brought to the forefront a concern for the due process rights of mentally
ill people committed to psychiatric facilities.1 In 1972 the United States
Supreme Court focused on the due process rights of mentally ill criminal defendants in Jackson v. Indiana2 when it held that, absent a civil commitment, 3 a
state can hold a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial4 no longer than is
necessary to determine whether he will regain competency. 5 In response to
Jackson, the North Carolina General Assembly has adopted statutes permitting
the extended commitment of incompetent defendants only through civil commitment proceedings. 6 The commitment of incompetent defendants for extended
1. Miller & Fiddlemann, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Result of the
1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C.L. REv. 985, 986 (1982).
2. 406 U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972).
3. As a result of the mental health movement, almost all states now require compliance with
procedural safeguards and a determination that a person is dangerous before permitting the state to
confine a person involuntarily in an inpatient mental health care facility. Arvanites, The Impact of
State Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalizationon Commitments for Incompetency to Stand Trial, 26
CRIMINOLOGY 307, 307 (1988). By 1981, 46 states had made these changes. Id. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 394.467 (1989); MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (1990). Following these changes in civil commitment law, fewer people are eligible for involuntary civil commitment. Arvanites, supra, at 307.
4. Courts began recognizing the doctrine of pretrial incompetency as early as the mid-seven.

teenth century. S.HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 20 (1986). Incompetency
should not be confused with insanity at the time of offense. An incompetent defendant may not have
been mentally ill at the time of the offense. Winick & DeMeo, Competence to Stand Trial in Florida,
35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 31, 36-37 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has held that competency
of a defendant is "fundamental to an adversary system ofjustice." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
172 (1975). A state deprives a defendant of his right to due proess of law if it fails to follow
procedures "adequate to protect [his] right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand
trial." Id. (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-87 (1966)). The trial court "must always be
alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial." Id. at 181.
5. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. Before Jackson, incompetent defendants faced automatic commitment to mental hospitals for indeterminate periods of time. Winick & DeMeo, supra note 4, at
33. One man, found incompetent to stand trial for burglary in 1901, was sent to Matteawan Hospital in New York and remained there for sixty-four years. T. MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 118 (1985). The state never dropped the
charges against him. Id. Another, arrested for stealing a horse and buggy, was sent to the same
hospital in 1905; he remained there until 1964, when he finally obtained his release at age eightynine. Id.
6. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1286, 1974 N.C. Sess. Laws 546 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-1001 to -1009 (1988 & Supp. 1990)). Beginning in the 1970s, some states started to provide
defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity, as well as incompetent defendants, with the same
legal protections as those committed under civil statutes. S. HALLECK, supra note 4, at 52. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (1988). As a result, some defendants acquitted by reason of insanity
were permitted to return to the community. T. MAEDER, supra note 5, at 132. North Carolina law
requires civil commitment of defendants who are acquitted by reason of insanity. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1321 (1988). This may change soon, however. One North Carolina woman, outraged about
the possible release of her daughter's murderer from a state mental hospital, "threw herself into
efforts to change the law regarding people found not guilty by reason of insanity. She took time off
from her job in a hair-styling salon to gather petitions, shake hands and serve on a study commission." Raleigh News and Observer, April 10, 1991, at 1B, col. 2. On April 9, 1991, North Carolina's House of Representatives, by a vote of 106 to 3, passed a bill requiring automatic commitment
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periods only through civil commitment procedures has created a new category
of defendants: those who are neither competent to stand trial nor subject to civil
commitment. 7 The appropriate treatment of defendants in this category has perplexed scholars, legislators, and courts seeking to balance the defendant's due
process rights against the public's interest in protection from potentially dangerous people.

In State v. Gravette8 the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed a trial
court's attempt to balance an incompetent defendant's liberty interests against
the public's safety concerns. 9 In Gravette the trial court claimed the inherent
power of the courts as its basis for a conditional release order not specifically
authorized by statute.10 The North Carolina Supreme Court denied that the

trial court had an inherent power to order such a release, noting that "'the
courts must make do with what is currently provided by the General Assembly.""' The court also suggested that although the General Assembly has provided some alternatives for the treatment of incompetent defendants who will
not become competent, the General Assembly's provisions may not be adequate
12
in every case.
This Note assesses the alternatives that the General Assembly has provided
for treating defendants who are not competent to stand trial and addresses common concerns about systems for handling incompetent defendants. The Note
then examines the adequacy of North Carolina's existing system. Finally, this
Note suggests that a statutory amendment could eliminate some of the problems
faced by the trial court and the defendant in Gravette.
In November 1984 Robert Gravette was assaulted and shot behind his right
ear with a .22 caliber pistol. 13 As a result of the gunshot wound, Gravette suffered organic brain damage. 14 On February 1, 1987, he was arrested and
charged with two counts of first degree murder. 15 Soon after the state charged
Gravette with murder, his court-appointed counsel moved for a psychiatric evalof persons acquitted by reason of insanity and making it more difficult for them to get out of hospitals. Id. at col. 1. The new measure, if passed in the senate, will require the defendant to prove,
before he may be released, that he is not dangerous to others and that he is not suffering from a
mental illness that requires hospitalization. S. 43, General Assembly of North Carolina, 1991 Sess.
at 3.
7. Some defendants who are not mentally ill are incompetent to stand trial. For example, a
person who is deaf, mute, or mentally retarded is not mentally ill but may not be able to communicate effectively enough to understand her situation. S. HALLECK, supra note 4, at 25. Professor
Halleck also notes that "[i]ncompetent defendants have, after all, not been tried and their violence
has not been proven. Under current commitment standards, 'unrestorable' incompetents who have
actually committed violent crimes might be released." Id. at 25-26.
8. 327 N.C. 114, 393 S.E.2d 865 (1990).
9. Id. at 118, 393 S.E.2d at 868.
10. Id. at 122, 393 S.E.2d at 870.
11. Id. at 124, 393 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting In re Swindell, 326 N.C. 473, 475, 390 S.E.2d 134,
136 (1990)).
12. Id. at 121-22, 393 S.E.2d at 870.

13. Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, or Alternatively, Prohibition and Response to
Petition for Writ of Supersedeas and Temporary Stay at 1, Gravette, (Nos. 87-CR-1 159, 87-CR1160) [hereinafter Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus].
14. Id.
15. Id. According to the defendant's Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the victims
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uation to determine Gravette's competence to stand trial. 16

Over a three-year period, trial courts ordered five evaluations of Gravette's
competency to stand trial. 17 Each time, examining psychiatrists recommended

that the court find Gravette incompetent to stand trial.

8

Twice, a superior

court judge found Gravette incompetent to stand trial.19 Trial courts ordered

20
evaluations of Gravette for involuntary commitment purposes three times.

Over this three-year period, Gravette spent a total of nearly thirteen months in

state mental institutions. 2 1 When he was not hospitalized during this period,
Gravette remained confined in the Orange County Jail.

On January 19, 1990, Gravette applied for pretrial release before Judge D.
of these killings were two men who had come into the defendant's house and who were harassing

him. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at 2-4. In addition to organic brain damage, Gravette suffered from diabetes and hypertension. Order Pertaining to Capacity to Proceed and Involuntary Commitment of Person Charged
with Violent Crimes at 1, Gravette, (Nos. 87-CRS-1 159, 87-CRS-1 160). He was taking several types

of medication for his physical ailments, as well as medication to reduce his compulsiveness and

depression, and to help him sleep. Id. at 1-2. During a competency hearing on March 21, 1988, he
sobbed continuously and shook uncontrollably. Id. at 2.
17. Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2-5.

18. Id.
19. Id. On March 22, 1988, Judge F. Gordon Battle declared Gravette incompetent to stand
trial. Id. at 2. On December 14, 1989, Judge Battle found that Gravette was still incompetent to
proceed. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 2-3. Gravette was involuntarily committed to John Umstead Hospital from March
23, 1988, to July 5, 1988. Id. at 2. He returned to the Orange County Jail when doctors at Umstead
Hospital found that he was no longer dangerous to himself or others. Id. He was again committed
to Umstead Hospital for a determination of dangerousness on January 12, 1989. Id. at 3. On February 9, 1989, the district court in Granville County found that Gravette was not dangerous to himself
or others and returned him to the Orange County Jail. Id. On August 10, 1989, Judge Battle
committed Gravette to Dorothea Dix Hospital, to assess both whether Gravette could stand trial
and whether he was dangerous to himself or others. Id. at 4. Gravette returned to the Orange
County Jail on December 7, 1989. Id.
21. Two days after Gravette's arrest on murder charges, his court-appointed counsel requested
an evaluation of Gravette's competency to stand trial. Order Pertaining to Capacity to Proceed and
Involuntary Commitment of Person Charged With Violent Crimes at I. Gravette remained at Dorothea Dix Hospital for evaluation from February 5, 1987 through March 30, 1987. Id. More than
nine months later, on December 17, 1987, the court again sent Gravette to Dorothea Dix Hospital
for a competency evaluation. Id. This time, he remained at Dix from December 17, 1987 through
January 25, 1988. Id. On March 22, 1988, Judge Battle entered an order declaring the defendant
incompetent to stand trial. Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2. Judge Battle also
ordered that involuntary civil commitment proceedings take place in district court. Id.
The district court committed Gravette to John Umstead Hospital, and he was admitted on
March 23, 1988. Id After Gravette's relatively brief stay at that hospital, doctors determined that
he was mentally Mnbut was not dangerous to himself or others. Id. As a result of these findings,
Gravette was no longer subject to the civil commitment order and returned on July 5, 1988, to the
Orange County Jail. Id.
On July 7, 1988, the court sent Gravette to Dorothea Dix Hospital for a third evaluation of his
competency to stand trial. Id. Again, the examining psychiatrist found that Gravette did not have
the capacity to proceed to trial. Id. at 2-3. As required by the commitment order, Gravette returned
to the Orange County Jail on July 25, 1988, and remained there until December 7, 1988, when Judge
Robert L. Farmer ordered him returned to Dorothea Dix Hospital for yet another evaluation of his
capacity to stand trial. Id. at 3. Again Gravette was found incompetent to proceed, and was returned to the Orange County Jail on January 3, 1989. Id.
On January 12, 1989, Gravette went to Umstead Hospital to be evaluated both for competency
to proceed and for dangerousness to himself or others. Id. On February 9, 1989, the court determined that Gravette was not dangerous to himself or others. Id. Gravette then returned to the
Orange County Jail. Id.
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B. Herring. 22 Judge Herring ordered a conditional pretrial release, assigning
custody of Gravette to his then ex-wife. 23 Judge Herring ordered the Durham
branch of the State Division of Adult Probation and Parole (DAPP) to supervise
Gravette's pretrial release and to make written reports to the court regarding his
supervision. 24 The Durham DAPP office notified the court that it would not
consent to the order and filed a petition in the North Carolina Supreme Court
for a writ of mandamus, 25 or alternatively, for a writ of prohibition2 6 to void
Judge Herring's order. 27
The North Carolina Supreme Court only addressed whether the trial court
had statutory or inherent power to compel DAPP, "without its consent, to supervise the conditional release of a pretrial detainee who has not been tried or
convicted because of his lack of capacity to proceed to trial."' 28 The court considered statutes cited by Judge Herring2 9 as the basis for his order and determined that statutes concerning probation,3 0 bail and pretrial release,3 1 and
capacity to proceed 32 did not authorize the trial court's order requiring DAPP
22. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 117, 393 S.E.2d at 867. Earlier, on April 3, 1989, Gravette had
moved for his conditional release from the Orange County Jail. Response to Petition for Writ of
Mandamus at 3. At that time Gravette's psychiatrist proposed conditions on his release, and
Gravette's ex-wife agreed to take custody of him. Id. at 3-4. On April 7, 1989, Superior Court Judge
B. Craig Ellis ordered the proposed release and added the requirement that the probation staff in
Durham County supervise Gravette. Id. at 4. Judge Ellis received a great deal of publicity after the
order, and many North Carolinians wrote to him expressing their concern over the defendant's
release. Id. Judge Ellis was spared from continued adverse publicity a few days later, when
Gravette's ex-wife was unable to take custody of him. Id. On June 8, 1989, Gravette again sought
his conditional release. Id. This time, Judge Ellis refused to grant the motion for conditional re-

lease. Id.
On August 10, 1989, after Judge Ellis had denied Gravette's motion for release, Superior Court
Judge F. Gordon Battle sent the defendant back to Dorothea Dix Hospital again for two purposes:
first, to determine whether Gravette was competent to stand trial, and second, to evaluate whether
he satisfied the requirements for involuntary civil commitment. Id. at 4-5. The hospital returned
Gravette to Orange County officials on December 7, 1989. Id. at 4. On December 14, 1989, Judge
Battle held a hearing, found that Gravette was still incompetent to stand trial, and began involuntary
commitment proceedings against him. Id. at 5. The court committed Gravette to outpatient treatment on January 12, 1990. Id. It is unclear whether he ever received treatment. Gravette, 327 N.C.
at 121, 393 S.E.2d at 870.
23. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 117, 393 S.E.2d at 867.
24. Id.
25. A writ of mandamus orders a lower court to perform a duty imposed by law. Nebel v.
Nebel, 241 N.C. 491, 499, 85 S.E.2d 876, 882 (1955).
26. The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandamus. Instead of ordering a
lower court to perform a duty, it orders the lower court not to take an illegal action. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIoNARY 1212 (6th ed. 1990). See, eg., In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 313, 255 S.E.2d 142, 147
(1979) (ordering district court judge not to give defendants a sentence other than the one mandated
by statute).
27. Petition for Writ of Mandamus or, Alternatively, Prohibition at 1, Gravette, (99PA90).
DAPP cited, as one of its reasons for refusing to comply with the conditional release order, its fear of
civil liability if it voluntarily complied with an order for which there was no statutory authority,
especially given the background of this case, see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text, and the
potential of harm to third parties. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 117, 393 S.E.2d at 867.
28. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 119, 393 S.E.2d at 868.
29. Id.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1341 to -1347 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
31. Id. § 15A-534(a)(3) (Supp. 1990).
32. Id. § 15A-1004 (1988).
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to supervise the defendant.3 3 After determining that no statute authorized the
order, the supreme court addressed whether the trial court could imply authority from the statutes it cited as the basis for its order.3 4 The North Carolina
courts resist the doctrine of implied powers; 35 in this vein, the court held that
"[t]he only powers implied or reasonably inferred from a statute are those essential to effectuate its terms."' 36 Since there were no applicable statutory provisions in this case, the trial court could not imply authority for the order.
Finally, the court asked whether the superior court had the inherent power
to enter the order in question. 37 The court did not address this question at great
length, remarking that the North Carolina Constitution vests the legislative
power of the state in the General Assembly, 38 and when the legislature chooses
to legislate in a particular area, it is beyond the scope of the court's power to
amend that legislation by inserting provisions left out by the General Assembly. 3 9 Although the court acknowledged that North Carolina's statutes do not
address adequately the situation presented in this case, it refused to allow the
33. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 122, 393 S.E.2d at 870.

34. Id.
35. See id. at 123-24, 393 S.E.2d at 871. The court noted that, in the past, North Carolina
judges have attempted to "craft alternatives based on either the implied or inherent power of the
court." Id. at 123, 393 S.E.2d at 871. In each of those cases, the court of appeals or the supreme
court found the judge in error. Id. See also Mallard, InherentPowerof the CourtsofNorth Carolina,
10 WAKE FoRasr L. REv. 1, 14-20 (1974) (citing examples of judicial acts held to exceed courts'
authority).
36. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 122, 393 S.E.2d at 870. The court quoted Judge Mallard: "'[i]mplied
powers are such as are necessary to make available and carry into effect those powers which are
expressly granted or conferred, and which must therefore be presumed to have been within the
intention of the constitutional or legislative grant.'" Id. (quoting Mallard, supra note 35, at 12).
37. Id. Courts in North Carolina possess three basic types of powers:
(1) those powers embodied in the constitution, which the legislature has no power to
change; (2) those powers conferred on the General Court of Justice or one of its divisions
by act of the legislature and which do not violate any provisions of the constitution; and (3)
those powers of the court that are inherent in it by virtue of the fact that, under the constitution, the judicial power of the state is vested in the General Court of Justice except such
as may be constitutionally vested in administrative agencies under article IV, section 3, and
in the Court for the Trial of Impeachments under Article IV, section 4.
Mallard, supra note 35, at 11. Judge Mallard noted that inherent powers often result from a "lack of
specific constitutional or legislative authority as to those matters or things that are reasonably necessary in the proper and correct administration ofjustice." Id. at 12. Inherent powers are "reasonably
necessary for the exercise of [the court's] proper function and jurisdiction in the administration of
justice and . . . not granted or denied to it by the constitution or by a constitutionally enacted
statute." Id. at 13. See N.C. CONST. art. IV. One example of the court's inherent power is the
inherent power "to construe the constitution and to declare acts of the legislative branch of the
government unconstitutional." Mallard, supra note 35, at 20. See, eg., Mitchell v. Financing Auth.,
273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1968); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787). For a
discussion of other inherent powers, see Mallard, supra note 35, at 20-23.
Although implied powers are sometimes confused with inherent powers, the two types of authority differ. Id. at 12. Implied powers are those that a court must invoke to enforce "powers
which are expressly granted or conferred and which must therefore be presumed to have been within
the intention of the constitutional or legislative grant." Id. The Gravette court found no statutory
basis for the trial judge's order, and therefore found that the trial court could have no implied power
to issue the order. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 122, 393 S.E.2d at 870.
38. See N.C. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
39. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 123, 393 S.E.2d at 870-71. Inherent power is "limited to such powers
as are essential to the existence of the court and necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of its
jurisdiction." Hopkins v. Barnhardt, 223 N.C. 617, 619-20, 27 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1943).
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trial court to fashion its own remedy.4 '
The supreme court alluded to the trial court's failure to use available statu-

tory options that could have solved the problem in this case. Specifically, the
court pointed to the availability of involuntary outpatient commitment procedures and statutes providing for civil incompetency and guardianship. 41 Because the Gravette court reviewed the case only to determine whether the trial
court could order DAPP to supervise the defendant,4 2 the court did not discuss
the applicability of these provisions to incompetent defendants who are not sub-

ject to involuntary inpatient commitment.
The United States Supreme Court has characterized the rule requiring defendants to be mentally competent before they can be tried as "fundamental to

an adversary system of justice."'43 To find a defendant competent, the court
must do more than find that "the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and

[has] some recollection of events;" it must also ask whether the defendant "has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceeding against him." 4 4 The North Carolina General As-

sembly has codified this competency requirement by providing:
No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a

crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to compre-

hend his own situation in reference to the proceedings,
or to assist in
45
his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.

The prosecutor, the defendant, defense counsel, or the court may raise the issue
46
of incapacity to stand trial at any time.

40. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 123, 393 S.E.2d at 871-72. The court noted in Gravette that it had
faced the problem of inadequate treatment alternatives before, particularly in the context of juvenile
incompetents. Id. at 123-24, 393 S.E.2d at 871. See, eg., In re Swindell, 326 N.C. 473, 475, 390
S.E,2d 134, 136 (1990); In re Wharton, 305 N.C. 565, 570, 290 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1982); In re
Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 548, 272 S.E.2d 861, 871 (1981); In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 173, 352
S.E.2d 449, 453 (1987).
41. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 122, 393 S.E.2d at 870; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-271(a)(1)
(Supp. 1990), 35A-1101 to -1244 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
42. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 119, 393 S.E.2d at 868. For a discussion of the difference between
inpatient and outpatient commitment, see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
43. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
44. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § ISA-1001(a) (1988). See also State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 70, 161
S.E.2d 560, 566 (1968) (case law setting out the competency standard before the legislature adopted
section 15A-1001(a)). Despite the defendant's disability, the court can still move forward with any
motions that can be handled by defense counsel without the defendant's assistance. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1001(b) (1988). The trial judge has discretion to determine the competency of a defendant, and this determination is conclusive on appeal if the evidence supports it. State v. Reid, 38
N.C. App. 547, 548-49, 248 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1978) (citing State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 575, 234
S.E.2d 587, 592 (1977)), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 588, 254 S.E.2d 31 (1979).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002(a) (Supp. 1990). The fact that the prosecutor can bring up
the incompetency issue has disturbed some commentators. Professor Halleck notes that while some
prosecutors ask for a competency examination to avoid having a conviction overturned on appeal,
prosecutors
have also been known to invoke competency proceedings over the defendant's objection in
order to avoid a criminal trial when the State's evidence was weak. Defendants who are
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Once the competency issue is before the court, the court can assess the

defendant's competency in one of two ways. First, the court may appoint a
medical expert who evaluates the defendant, returns a written report on the defendant's mental condition, and possibly testifies at a later hearing. 47 Second,
the court may commit the defendant to "a State mental health facility for observation and treatment for the period necessary to determine the defendant's capacity to proceed [but no longer than sixty days]." 48 Following the competency
evaluation, the court must hold a hearing to determine the defendant's capacity
49
to proceed to trial.
If the court finds the defendant incompetent to proceed to trial, the judge
will next consider whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that the defendant
meets the criteria for involuntary civil commitment.5 0 If reasonable grounds
exist, the judge will issue a custody order, and if the state has charged the defendant with a violent crime, a law enforcement officer will take the defendant to
a twenty-four-hour mental health care facility.5 1 Thereafter, proceedings are in
52
accordance with the civil commitment statutes.
When the court finds that a defendant is incompetent to proceed, it must
act to safeguard the defendant and to ensure his return for trial if he regains
competency.5 3 The court must include several provisions in its order committing the defendant to a mental health care facility for evaluation. First, the
mental health care facility taking custody of the defendant must notify the clerk
of court if the defendant becomes eligible for release.5 4 Additionally, if the defendant faces charges of a violent crime, the mental health care facility may
release the defendant only into the custody of a law enforcement agency specified in the commitment order.5 5 Finally, the facility must report to the court
periodically and inform it of the likelihood that the defendant will regain capac56
ity to proceed to trial.
If the incompetent defendant satisfies involuntary commitment requirements, North Carolina courts may commit him to two basic forms of care: inpatient or outpatient. The state places a person committed to inpatient care in a

hospital. A person committed to outpatient treatment is not confined to a hospifound incompetent to stand trial commonly spend weeks or even months in a maximum
security hospital.... Finding a defendant incompetent to stand trial is one way prosecutors can ensure that offenders will, at least temporarily, be kept off the streets.
S. HALLECK, supra note 4, at 21-22.

47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002(b)(1) (Supp. 1990).
48. Id. § 15A-1002(b)(2). The director of the facility reports on the defendant's mental condition and sends the report to defense counsel and to the clerk of court. Id.
49. Id. § 15A-1002(b).
50. Id. § 15A-1003(a) (1988). If the judge does not find reasonable grounds to believe the de-

fendant satisfies civil commitment criteria, the defendant may seek release. See Id. §§ 15A-533 to
-534 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
51. Id. § 15A-1003(a) (1988). The custody order will indicate that the defendant faces charges
of a violent crime. Id.

52. Id; see id. §§ 122C-261 to -277 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 15A-1004(a) (1988).
Id. § 15A-1004(c).
Id.
Id. § 15A-1004(d).
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tal, but may receive a variety of treatments. Courts may prescribe for outpa-

tients any services or treatment "either to alleviate the individual's illness or
disability, to maintain semi-independent functioning, or to prevent further deterioration that may reasonably be predicted to result in the need for inpatient
' 57
commitment to a 24-hour facility."

Although treated within the civil commitment scheme, incompetent defendants receive a somewhat different treatment than civil respondents. A quali-

fied physician must examine a civil respondent or a criminal defendant within
twenty-four hours of his arrival at an around-the-clock mental health care facility.58 The physician will determine whether the patient is dangerous to himself
or others; a dangerously mentally illperson is subject to inpatient commitment.5 9 If the physician decides that the patient is not dangerous to himself or

others, she will determine whether the patient meets the qualifications for outpatient release. 6° A mentally ill person is subject to outpatient commitment if she
needs treatment to avoid becoming dangerous, is unable to make an informed

decision about seeking treatment, and is capable of surviving safely in the community. 6 1 If the examining physician finds that a civil respondent does not meet
the criteria for either inpatient or outpatient commitment, the physician must
release the respondent. 62 When the state has charged a defendant with a violent
crime, however, and the court has found him incompetent to proceed, the physi-

cian may not release the defendant from the facility until the trial court orders
63
her to do So.

Once a hospital has taken custody of a civil commitment respondent, the
district court must hold a commitment hearing within ten days.64 If the hearing

is to determine the applicability of inpatient commitment, the respondent has a
57. Id. § 122C-3(27) (Supp. 1990).
58. Id. § 122C-266(a) (Supp. 1990).
59. Id. § 122C-266(a)(1). The court may commit a person to inpatient treatment if he is "mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others, or is mentally retarded, and because of an accompanying
behavior disorder, is dangerous to others." Id. § 122C-263(d)(2) (1989). A person may be dangerous to himself if,
within the relevant past, he has exhibited behavior showing an inability to exercise
judgment in daily activities or to satisfy his needs for nourishment, shelter, and other incidents of
survival; if he has attempted or threatened suicide and may reasonably be expected to commit suicide without treatment; or if he has mutilated himself or attempted mutilation, and may reasonably
be expected to continue doing so without treatment. Id. § 122C-3(11)(a) (Supp. 1990). A person is
dangerous to others when, in the relevant past, he has inflicted, or has attempted or threatened to
inflict, serious bodily harm on another; has created a substantial risk of bodily harm on another; or
has engaged in extreme property destruction. Id. § 122C-3(11)(b). "Clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that an individual has committed a homicide in the relevant past is prima facie evidence of

dangerousness to others." Id.
The fact that the respondent needs custodial care as a result of mental illness may not be enough
alone to justify inpatient commitment. In re Doty, 38 N.C. App. 233, 234, 247 S.E.2d 628, 629
(1978) (decided under former statutory provision, N.C. GEN. STAT § 122-58.2(1) (1981) (replaced
by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11) (Supp. 1990))).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-266(a)(2) (Supp. 1990).
61. Id. § 122C-263(d)(1) (1989). In a commitment case of civil origin, the physician's finding
that the respondent qualifies for outpatient commitment will result in the respondent's release pending the district court commitment hearing. Id. § 122C-266(a)(2) (Supp. 1990).
62. Id. § 122C-266(a)(3). At this point the court will terminate commitment proceedings. Id.
63. Id. § 122C-266(b). Because the statute makes no exception for defendants charged with
nonviolent crimes, these defendants would be released as civil respondents would be.
64. Id. §§ 122C-267 to -268 (1989 & Supp. 1990). The hearing will be in the district court of
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right to appointed counsel, regardless of ability to pay. 65 At an outpatient commitment hearing the court may, but is not required to, appoint counsel for indigent respondents if the issues in the case are so complex that a respondent needs
the assistance of a lawyer. 66 To commit a person to either inpatient or outpatient treatment, the court must find by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence"
that the person satisfies the commitment requirements. 67
At the district court hearing, the judge may make one of four dispositions:

he may commit the respondent to outpatient treatment, inpatient treatment, or a
combination of outpatient and inpatient treatment, or he may find that the respondent does not meet the criteria for either outpatient or inpatient commitment. 68 If the court finds that the respondent does not meet either commitment
criteria, the court must discharge her. 6 9 If the court finds that the respondent is
dangerous to herself or others, the court may order inpatient commitment for up
71
to ninety days. 70 The court must hold periodic hearings for recommitments.
The first recommitment may be for up to 180 days, with subsequent recommitments of up to a year.72 Before the mental health care facility may discharge a
defendant accused of a violent crime, the court must schedule a rehearing and
must notify the district attorney and chief district judge of the prosecuting
73
jurisdiction.
If the respondent is eligible for outpatient commitment, the court may order commitment of up to ninety days, with periodic rehearings and possible recommitments for 180 days at a time. 74 A mental health care facility may not
force treatment upon a person under an outpatient commitment order. 75 If a
person refuses to comply with treatment ordered by the mental health care facility, the facility must make all reasonable efforts to obtain compliance and must
document the efforts made.76 If the person is failing to comply but does not
the jurisdiction where the mental health facility is located. Id. The district court may grant a continuance of up to five days. Id.
65. Id. § 122C-268(d) (Supp. 1990).
66. Id. § 122C-267(d) (1989).
67. Id. § 122C-267(h) to -2680) (1989 & Supp. 1990). For the specific commitment requirements, see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-271(b)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1990).
69. Id. § 122C-271(b)(3). The General Assembly has not distinguished incompetent defendants
from other respondents at the district court hearing.
70. Id. § 122C-271(b)(2).
71. Id. § 122C-276(a) (1989).
72. Id. § 122C-276(d). Recommitment hearings take place in the district court of the jurisdic-

tion where the mental health facility is located. That court must inform the district court and the
district attorney of the prosecuting jurisdiction that rehearings are scheduled. Id. § 122C-276(a),
(f). At any rehearings, the court has the option of ordering outpatient commitment for a period of
up to 180 days. Id. § 122C-276(g).
73. Id. § 122C-277(b) (1989). The district attorney of the prosecuting jurisdiction may represent the state at the hearing. Id. These notification requirements are in addition to the limitations
on the defendant's release ordered by the prosecuting jurisdiction. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-271(b)(1) (Supp. 1990), 122C-275(c) (1989). If the court committed the respondent as a result of her being charged with a violent crime, the commitment order
must so state. Id. § 122C-271(b)(1) (Supp. 1990).
75. Id. § 122C-273(a)(1) (Supp. 1990).
76. Id.
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overtly refuse to comply, the facility may request that the court order the person
brought to the facility for examination. 77 Unless the person presents an immediate danger to himself or others, the facility may not force him to take medication
or to receive treatment. 78 Additionally, a person committed to outpatient treatment may petition the court for termination of the order at any time. 79 In the
case of defendants initially committed as a result of a charge of criminal violence, the facility may not discontinue treatment until the court permits it to do
8
so. 0

It may appear that once the court finds a defendant incompetent, it treats
the defendant as it does any other respondent in a civil commitment proceeding.
This appearance is misleading in some situations. Although courts will treat
defendants charged with minor crimes as any other person who has been civilly
committed, it is more difficult for a person accused of a violent crime to obtain
release from a mental institution, even though he has been committed by a civil
commitment order. A mental health care facility may release the "pure" civil
commitment respondent upon a psychiatrist's determination that the respondent
is no longer dangerous to herself or others, but it must notify the court fifteen
days before releasing a defendant facing charges of a violent crime. 8 ' The court
then will conduct a hearing on the question of dangerousness before allowing the
82
release of such a defendant.
Additionally, before releasing an incompetent defendant charged with a violent crime, the court hearing the case must notify the chief district judge and
the district attorney in the jurisdiction where the defendant initially was found
incompetent to proceed.8 3 Under North Carolina General Statutes section 15A1004, the prosecuting jurisdiction generally will have ordered the mental health
facility to release the defendant only into the custody of that jurisdiction's law
enforcement officers. 84 Thus, even if one court finds that the defendant is not
dangerous to himself or others, the prosecuting jurisdiction still can prevent release of the defendant. 85 If the defendant still faces charges of a violent crime,
77. Id. § 122C-273(a)(2).
78. Id. § 122C-273(a)(3). When the examination is over, the defendant may go home unless he
poses an immediate threat to himself or others. If the defendant does pose an immediate threat, the
facility will take custody of the defendant as permitted under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263, which
provides for inpatient commitment, and the physician's report finding dangerousness may substitute
for the initial examination required under this section. Id. If the defendant is not dangerous, the
court may hold supplemental hearings to amend or terminate the outpatient commitment order if
necessary. Id. § 122C-274 (Supp. 1990).
79. Id. § 122C-274(e).
80. Id. § 122C-273(d) (Supp. 1990). Although the outpatient facility must obtain the supervising court's approval to discontinue treatment, officials in the jurisdiction that found the defendant

incompetent to stand trial (or not guilty by reason of insanity) must receive notice of the commitment hearing. Id. § 122C-277(b) (1989).
81. Id. § 122C-277(b).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 122C-264 (1989).
84. Id. § 15A-1004(c) (1988).
85. This is what happened to Robert Gravette. Every time a hospital discharged him, he returned to the Orange County Jail. See Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2-4.
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he will return to the custody of the jurisdiction that originally charged him with
the commission of that crime.
North Carolina does not require the court to dismiss charges against an
incompetent defendant at any time. The court has discretion to dismiss the

charges under some circumstances. 86 Additionally, the prosecutor may elect to
take a dismissal with leave under section 15A-1009. This permits the prosecutor

to remove the case from the docket, but allows her to bring the charges again

when she determines that the defendant has or will become competent to stand
trial. 7 Both of these provisions give courts more control over the release of

defendants initially charged with violent crimes than they have over the release
88
of other people committed to treatment for mental illness.
In Jackson v. Indiana8 9 the United States Supreme Court considered

whether the unlimited commitment of an incompetent defendant to a mental
hospital, based solely on incompetency, deprived the defendant of his fourteenth

amendment equal protection and due process rights. 90 The Court compared
Indiana's statute for the commitment of incompetent defendants to its civil commitment statutes and determined that Indiana law provided substantial due process protections for respondents in civil cases, but did not provide such
safeguards for incompetent defendants. 9 1 The fact that the defendant faced
92
criminal charges could not justify such a disparity in due process protection.

The Court held that, because the defendant almost certainly would not regain
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1008 (1988). The court may dismiss charges against an incompetent defendant when it is satisfied that the defendant will not become competent to proceed, when
the defendant has already been confined for the maximum length of the sentence that can be imposed
for the crime charged, or upon the expiration of five years after the date of the incompetency determination in misdemeanor cases (ten years in felony cases). Id.
87. Id. § 15A-1009 (1988). The court still may dismiss the charges pursuant to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15a-1008 (1988); such a dismissal would prevent the prosecutor from bringing the charges
again. Id. § 15A-1009(e), (f).
88. Id. § 122C-277(b) (1989). Regardless of whether charges are still pending, "[i]f the respondent was initially committed as the result of conduct resulting in his being charged with a violent
crime," the attending physician recommending release must notify the clerk of the supervising court,
and the clerk of court must schedule a hearing. Id. The district court and district attorney of the
district that initially prosecuted the patient also receive notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id.
89. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
90. Id. at 719. Defendant Theon Jackson was mentally retarded, deaf, and mute. Id. at 717.
He allegedly committed two separate robberies in Marion County, Indiana, in which he stole a total
of nine dollars. Id. As soon as Jackson pleaded not guilty, the trial court instituted competency
proceedings under the Indiana statutory provision. Id. Although the two examining psychiatrists
testified that Jackson was unlikely to become competent, the court ordered him committed to the
Indiana Mental Health Department until the Department could certify to the court that Jackson was
"sane." Id. at 719. Jackson remained in a mental institution for three and a half years before the
Supreme Court heard his case. Id. at 739.
91. Id. at 720-21. The Court noted that the criminal proceeding did not require the state to
provide counsel, release, care for committed defendants, or periodic review of the defendant's condition. Id. The civil commitment proceedings did provide such safeguards. Id. at 721.
92. Id. at 724. The Court noted that in an earlier case it had held that a state prisoner civilly
committed at the end of his prison sentence has a right to a jury trial, just as any other person being
civilly committed. Id. at 723-24 (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111, 115 (1966)). If a
criminal conviction is insufficient to justify a denial of equal protection, the Court reasoned, certainly
the mere filing of charges is also insufficient. Id. at 724. See also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,
512 (1972) (commitment of defendant under Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Act could not be renewed
without procedural protections provided under civil commitment statute).
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competency, the state could not continue to confine him for the purpose of restoring his competency. 93 To continue confining him under these circumstances
would deprive him of his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the
laws.

94

Furthermore, the commitment statute at issue here deprived Jackson of his
fourteenth amendment right to due process. 9 5 The Court held that, if a person
is committed solely because of his incapacity to proceed to trial, the state cannot
confine him longer than is reasonable "to determine whether there is a substan96
tial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.", If
the defendant is not likely to regain capacity, then the state must either release

him or commit him through civil procedures. 97 Even if the defendant is likely to
regain competency, any continued commitment "must be justified by progress
98

toward that goal."1
The North Carolina General Assembly, in developing the current statutory
provisions concerning incompetent defendants, sought to satisfy the requirements established in Jackson.99 To ensure that a defendant's rights are not violated, the general assembly provided that when a defendant does not have the
capacity to proceed, the trial court will initiate civil commitment proceedings. t0
According to the official commentary, the general assembly felt that Jackson
required the release of non-dangerous incompetent defendants. 10 ' The legislature requires the commitment of incompetent defendants through civil commitment procedures to allow the release of defendants who are not dangerous but
1 2
who lack capacity for trial. 0
93. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 725-30. The Court reserved the possibility that the State could continue to hold a defendant as long as a recovery was possible. Id. at 725.
94. Id. at 730.
95. Id. at 731.
96. Id. at 738.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. Chapter 15A, Article 56 commentary (1988).
100. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1002(bl) (Supp. 1990), 15A-1003 (1988).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. Chapter 15A, Article 56 commentary (1988).
102. Id. Although a court must commit an incompetent defendant through civil commitment
procedures, it may use other statutory provisions to avoid releasing an incompetent defendant who
does not satisfy the requirements for involuntary civil commitment. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 35A-1101 to -1120 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (incompetency proceedings and appointment of guardians), 122C-231 (1989) (voluntary commitment to inpatient mental health care). The Gravette court
suggested that the district court ordering supervision of a defendant might, through civil proceedings, declare a person incompetent and assign a guardian for that person. Gravette, 327 N.C. at 122,
393 S.E.2d at 870. Any person may file a petition for an adjudication of incompetence. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 35A-1 105 (Supp. 1990). A court may find a person civilly incompetent if he "lacks sufficient
capacity to manage his own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions concerning his
person, family, or property whether such lack of capacity is due to mental illness, mental retardation, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, or similar cause or condition." Id. § 35A-1101(7) (Supp. 1990). In such a proceeding, the respondent has a right to an
attorney acting as a guardian ad litem. Id. § 35A-1107 (1987).
Once the court finds a person incompetent, it will appoint another person to act as the incompetent's legal guardian. Id. § 35A-1 120. That guardian may then voluntarily commit the incompetent
person to inpatient treatment if she is mentally ill. Id. § 122C-231 (1989). Through incompetency
proceedings and voluntary commitment, the court may commit the incompetent person to an inpatient facility without finding that person dangerous to herself or others, although the statute does
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Ten years after the legislature adopted the dangerousness standard for involuntary inpatient civil commitments, it designed the outpatient commitment
alternative, which requires a lower threshold of mental illness for commitment.10 3 Without the outpatient provision, the law had been "letting a needy
group slip through its cracks." 1 4 This group consisted of the chronically mentally ill who would not obtain treatment on their own and would deteriorate
without treatment to the point that they would become dangerous to themselves
and require hospitalization.10 5 Without outpatient commitment, courts could

not require a mentally ill person to receive treatment until she committed an act
that would satisfy the dangerousness requirement for involuntary inpatient commitment.10 6 Because of this limitation, many chronically mentally ill people revolved regularly in and out of state mental hospitals. 107
require that inpatient treatment be the least restrictive treatment alternative. Id. § 122C-232(b)
(1989).
One limitation on guardianship proceedings is that the court must base its appointment of a
guardian on the ward's best interest. Id. § 35A-1214 (Supp. 1990). The guardian should make
decisions for the incompetent only when the incompetent no longer has the capacity to make those
decisions. Id. § 35A-1201(a)(3). The General Assembly has determined that "[l]imiting the rights
of an incompetent person by appointing a guardian for him should not be undertaken unless it is
clear that a guardian will give the individual a fuller capacity for exercising his rights." Id. § 35A1201(a)(4). Thus, despite the availability of procedures for an incompetency determination and a
subsequent voluntary commitment to a mental health care facility, ethical and legal considerations
come into play when civil incompetency determinations become a tool for protecting society from a
mentally ill person instead of protecting a mentally ill person from society. A court should not
appoint a guardian without consideration of the individual's own needs.
103. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, The North CarolinaExperience with Outpatient Civil Commitment:
A CriticalApproach, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 215, 216 (1987). North Carolina was the first
state to develop such an alternative to inpatient commitment. Id. at 218. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
104. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 103, at 215.
105. Id. Many of these chronically mentally ill
people were former patients in state mental
hospitals who were released as a result of the social trend toward deinstitutionalization of mental
health care. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 1, at 990. Activists in the mental health field had
pushed for the closing of state mental hospitals, believing that the patients' communities would
provide adequate mental health care. Id. In response to this political pressure, state legislatures
passed statutes that made it more difficult to commit respondents. Id. at 990-991. While some
former patients of state mental hospitals were able to adapt to community life, others lived in "urban
psychiatric ghettoes... under conditions much worse than those of the institutions from which they
had been discharged." Id. at 991-992.
106. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 103, at 216. See also Miller & Fiddleman, supra note I,
at 996-97 (discussing the opinion of mental health care officials that a number of people who did well
on medication but stopped taking it after discharge could be treated successfully in a communitybased treatment program).
107. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 103, at 216. One survey found agreement among mental
health center and hospital staffs in North Carolina that outpatient commitment should be used with
patients "who have repeatedly responded well to treatment in the hospital ... but who repeatedly
have failed to continue treatment after discharge and eventually return to the hospital unnecessarily." Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 1, at 1011 n. 114.
Also as a consequence of the deinstitutionalization of mental health care, there are greater
numbers of the chronically mentally ill, who previously would have been diverted to mental hospitils through civil commitment, entering the criminal justice system and being found incompetent to
stand trial. Arvanites, supra note 3, at 317. See also Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand
Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 929-30 (1985) (stating that the effect of deinstitutionalization "has
been and will continue to be increased use of the criminal process and diversion through the incompetency commitment as an alternative method of providing treatment for mentally ill individuals
who commit minor crimes."). See generally L. BACHRACH, DEINsTruTIONALIZATON: AN ANA-

LYTICAL REVIEW AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1976) (providing an analytical review and

theoretical synthesis of issues in deinstitutionalization); Klerman, Better But Not Well: Social and
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The legislature deleted from the outpatient commitment provision some of
the due process protections provided for respondents under inpatient commitment proceedings when it lowered outpatient commitment criteria beneath those
required for inpatient commitment.10 8 As a trade-off for reduced protections in
the statute, the legislature provided that outpatient facilities could not force a
patient to receive treatment.1 ° 9 To encourage mental health centers to use outpatient commitment, the legislature allocated $2000 a year to mental health centers for each patient they supervised through outpatient commitment.1 10
Despite the allocation of funds, lawyers and mental health professionals have
criticized the statute's prohibition of forced treatment, and some judges and
mental health professionals have refused to use it because of its "lack of
teeth."'1 This mistrust of the outpatient commitment alternative is one reason
1 12
why the trial court refused to release Robert Gravette under this provision.
The Gravette case shows that, despite good intentions, the North Carolina
statutory scheme is significantly flawed. One of those flaws reflects the legal
community's mistrust of the outpatient commitment scheme-judges may be
reluctant to release incompetent defendants under outpatient commitment for
fear that the defendant will become violent before the court can order inpatient
commitment. Furthermore, the outpatient commitment provision does not address the problem of an increased number of mentally ill people moving in and
out of mental institutions as incompetent defendants. Commentators note that
as a result of more stringent requirements for involuntary inpatient commitment, more mentally ill people who at one time would have been institutionalized are ending up on the streets.11 3 With more mentally ill people in the
community, courts are using "the criminal process and diversion through the
incompetency commitment as an alternative method of providing treatment for
EthicalIssues in the Deinstitutionalizationof the Mentally Ill, 3 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 617 (1977)
(reviewing recent developments in mental health programs). A 1988 study found a rise in the
number of commitments resulting from incompetency to stand trial. Arvanites, supra note 3, at 317.
The same study also found an increase in the seriousness of the charges that the incompetent defend-

ants faced. Id. Arvanites suggests that either the more restrictive commitment criteria have resulted
in the failure to commit dangerous individuals, or mentally ill people who once would have been
hospitalized are going without treatment to the point that they become dangerous and commit
crimes. Id.
108. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 103, at 217. For a discussion of the constitutionality of
North Carolina's outpatient commitment procedures, see Note, Involuntary Outpatient Civil Commitment Expanded: The 1983 Changes, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1158 (1984).
109. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 103, at 218; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-265(c) (1989).
110. Act of July 20, 1983, ch. 864, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 1064.
111. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 103, at 218. See also Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 1,
at 1011 n. 114 (discussing opinions of some psychiatrists and judges that people dangerous enough to
satisfy the outpatient commitment requirements can be treated effectively only in hospitals).
112. When Judge Herring ordered Gravette's conditional release, he specifically found that outpatient commitment would not provide "reasonable supervision of the defendant, as he would be
likely to consume alcoholic beverages and cease taking stabilizing medication, thereby making
[Gravette] dangerous to himself and others." Modified Order at 5, Gravette, (Nos. 87-CRS-1 159, 87CRS-1 160). The specific purpose of outpatient commitment is to provide supervision that will prevent the type of behavior described by Judge Herring.
113. See, eg., S. HALLECK, supra note 4, at 5.
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mentally ill individuals." 114 Even where state laws specifically limit the length
of time for competency determinations, as does the North Carolina statute, 15
defendants still may spend a great deal of time in mental hospitals. For example, one commentator has noted that incompetent defendants treated with
psychotropic drugs may be confined for extended periods of time.1 16 Hospitals
treat defendants with drugs, stabilize them, and return them to court, where
they are found competent. 117 Upon returning to jail to await trial, however,
defendants rapidly destabilize, and once again they become incompetent.1 18 A
defendant may move from hospital to jail over and over again. One study of
incompetent defendants in North Carolina found the average length of hospitalization to be two to three years. 119

For example, Robert Gravette spent three years shuttling between the Orange County Jail and various mental hospitals.1 20 In North Carolina, when the
state accuses a defendant of a violent crime and commits him to a twenty-fourhour facility for evaluation or treatment, the prosecuting jurisdiction will order
the facility to release the defendant only into the custody of a designated law
enforcement agency. 121 If the defendant still faces charges, he will return to the
custody of the jurisdiction that originally brought him to trial. This happened in
Gravette; every time the district court found that Gravette did not qualify for
inpatient commitment, the hospital sent him back to the Orange County Jail.
The court then would send him to another mental health facility for evaluation
of competency to stand trial. After the competency evaluation, Gravette again
would return to the jail, only to be returned to a hospital for another commitment evaluation. This cycle went on for three years and theoretically could continue for the defendant's lifetime. The cycle terminates only when a judge or a
prosecutor exercises her discretion to dismiss or drop the charges against a
defendant. 122
Gravette was confined to jail and to high security mental health care facilities for three years, while physicians had testified that he probably never would
attain capacity to stand trial. 12 3 The judge who heard Gravette's case could
have committed him to outpatient care or could have ordered his pretrial release. The court resisted these possibilities because it was not satisfied with the
114. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial. An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposal
for Reform, 39 RUTGERs L. Rnv. 243, 246 (1987).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002(b)(2) (Supp. 1990).
116. Winick, supra note 114, at 248-49.

117. Id. See also Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 1, at 997 n.58 (listing articles discussing the
efficacy of psychotropic medications in maintaining remissions from mental illness).
118. Winick, supranote 114, at 248-49. Ifa defendant continues to take medication and remains
stable, he may stand trial based on the chemically-induced competency. State v. Buie, 297 N.C. 159,
161, 254 S.E.2d 26, 28 (citing State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 248, 204 S.E.2d 649, 656 (1974)), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 971 (1979).
119. R. RoAscH & S. GOLDINO, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 150 (1980).
120. See supra note 21. Recall that Theon Jackson, the defendant in Indiana v. Jackson, was
held only a few months longer than Gravette-three and a half years. 406 U.S. 715, 739 (1972).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1004(c) (1988).
122. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
123. Order of April 7, 1989, at 1, Gravette, (Nos. 87-CRS-1 159, 87-CRS-1 160).
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level of supervision provided under outpatient commitment. 124 Even if the
court had ordered Gravette's release, the criminal charges against him still
would have been pending or dismissed with leave' 25 unless the judge determined, in his discretion, that he should dismiss the charges completely. As long
as criminal charges are pending or dismissed with leave against a defendant, the
state may take custody of him any time the prosecutor thinks the defendant may
have regained competency to proceed with the trial. 12 6 This permits the prosecutor to reserve the option of reinstituting the cycle of evaluations.
The North Carolina General Assembly should take action to eliminate
these cycles of evaluation for several reasons. First, such extended detention
may deprive an incompetent defendant of his right to due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court in Jackson held
that a state could not hold an incompetent defendant longer than "the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain . . . capacity in the foreseeable future."' 127
Although the Jackson Court referred specifically to detention in a mental institution, a defendant who is not dangerous also has a considerable due process
interest in not being confined to jail when there is little chance of his becoming
competent to stand trial. Furthermore, even if the state does not confine the
defendant for the duration of the evaluation cycle, there may be a "denial of due
process inherent in holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over the head
of one who will never have a chance to prove his innocence."' 128
Second, a substantial delay in bringing a defendant's case to trial may limit
the defendant's ability to defend himself effectively. 129 As time passes, it becomes more difficult to gather evidence. 130 A defense of insanity often is appropriate for an incompetent defendant; this defense in particular requires proof of
the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime and therefore becomes more
131
difficult to prove with the passage of time.
Finally, repeated evaluations of the defendant's mental condition are expensive. Hospitalizations may be even more expensive, and detention of a defendant
13 2
in jail also can be Costly.

Some critics have suggested that a provisional trial of the incompetent de124. Modified Order at 5.
125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1009 (1988). If the court has not dismissed the charges against
an incompetent defendant, the prosecutor may enter a dismissal with leave. Id. at § 15A-1009(a).
Such a dismissal results in the removal of the case from the docket; the prosecutor may reinstitute
proceedings when the defendant becomes competent or when the prosecutor believes the defendant
may soon become competent. Id. § 15A-1009(b)-(d).
126. Id. § 15A-1009(d).
127. Indiana v. Jackson, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 740.
129. Winick, supra note 114, at 257.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 250. One evaluation of expenses in Dade County, Florida, found that an average
incompetent defendant cost the state $20,351. Id. One man had spent more than 10 years in hospitals and in jails being evaluated and treated. Id. The state had spent over $300,000 on his evaluations and incarceration. Id.
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fendant would ameliorate some of these problems. 133 Roesch and Golding, who
examined the North Carolina system in the 1970s, recommended such a sys-

tem. 134 They proposed that once a court finds a defendant incompetent, the
court should hold a hearing to determine whether probable cause for the charges
exists.' 35 At this stage, the state would drop the charges if probable cause did
not exist. 136 If probable cause did exist, the court could commit a defendant to a
three-month treatment period if it found treatment would likely restore the defendant's competency.137 After the three-month period, or immediately following the probable cause hearing if the court determined that a three-month
treatment would not restore the defendant's competence, the defendant would
participate in a trial or other judicial proceeding to determine his guilt.' 3 8 The
court would use special trial procedures to compensate for the defendant's incapacity. 139 If a defendant were found not guilty, he would be released. Roesch
and Golding suggest monitoring the defendant for competency throughout the
finding
trial; in the case of a guilty verdict, the court would make a competency
4
after the trial to determine whether the verdict should stand.' 0
Roesch and Golding's provisional trial alternative could reduce the time
incompetent defendants spend in treatment. This alternative also could exonerate defendants who have a good defense against the charges. They would receive treatment under the civil commitment laws and would no longer be subject
to competency evaluations. Defendants found guilty and later determined incompetent, however, still would be subject to continued evaluations and to new
trials if they became competent. 14 1 Although the provisional trial solution could
remove some permanently incompetent defendants from the criminal justice system, it would not solve the problem altogether. Additionally, courts may be
reluctant to accept this alternative, however tempting it may be. The justification for preventing incompetent defendants from coming to trial has been to
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

S. HALLECK, supra note 4, at 44-45.
R. RoESCH & S. GOLDING, supra note 119, at 209-16.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209.

139. Id. at 214. Roesch and Golding suggest several procedures to compensate for the defendant's mental condition. One provision calls for a screening panel that would observe and evaluate
the defendant throughout the trial. Id. at 209. At a post-trial competency hearing, this would provide evidence of the defendant's mental condition during the trial. Id. at 212. Four other procedures would actually alter the way the trial is run. First, the defendant would be entitled to pretrial
disclosure of the evidence that the prosecution might use at trial. Id. at 210. Second, the prosecution would carry a higher burden of proof than in a normal criminal trial. Id. Third, the procedures
would require corroboration of prosecution evidence concerning issues which the defendant may be
unable to rebut effectively. Id. Finally, the judge would instruct the jury to consider favorably any
of the defendant's disabilities. Id. at 210-211 (citing Burt & Morris, A Proposalforthe Abolition of
the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 66-95 (1972)).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 214-16. Roesch and Golding proposed that if the verdict were set aside because of
incompetency, the state could later bring a new trial. A finding of incompetency would not require
the judge to set aside the verdict if she found that the defendant's participation in the trial was not
critical or that the special trial procedures undertaken to account for the defendant's incompetency
permit the verdict to stand. Id.
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ensure the accuracy of the trial process, 142 and allowing a defendant to be tried

despite his incompetency may be a violation of his right to due process of law,
whether his lawyer thinks trial is a good idea or not.143 Furthermore, the North
Carolina Supreme Court requires a court first to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial before a trial may take place. 144 The North Carolina
Supreme Court thus may not accept the post-trial competency determination

proposed here.
Another possible solution to the problem of repeated psychiatric evaluations and hospitalizations of incompetent defendants is to require the court, at
some point, to dismiss the charges against a defendant not subject to civil commitment and unlikely to become competent to stand trial. Before incarcerating
an incompetent defendant for an extended period of time, the state could cut its

losses and protect an incompetent defendant's rights by treating him as any
other civil respondent in a commitment case. Although judges and prosecutors
currently have discretion to do this, political pressure on judges and prosecutors

may make it difficult for them to exercise discretion in dismissing or dropping

charges, even when the defendant is not violent and will never be competent. 145

This is especially true when the state has charged a defendant with a violent
crime; in that situation a judge or prosecutor runs the risk of incurring public

wrath if he drops the charges against the defendant.
The state does have an interest in protecting the public from dangerous
people. The involuntary civil commitment statutes address this interest by al-

lowing the state to hospitalize a person who is dangerous to himself or to
others. 146 North Carolina's civil commitment scheme also provides for a lesser
degree of supervision, designed to permit some mentally ill people-those who

are likely to become dangerous without treatment, but who are not dangerous so
long as they follow their treatment plans-to receive treatment in the community. The State should order treatment and supervision within this outpatient

treatment system for defendants who are incompetent, but not dangerous, and
who will never become competent. 147 Removing these people from the criminal
142. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); see, e.g., Hamm v. Jabe, 706 F.2d 765, 767
(6th Cir. 1983) (trial court may halt trial over objection once it becomes convinced of defendant's
incompetency, even though defense wants trial to continue); Meeks v. Smith, 512 F. Supp. 335, 338
(W.D.N.C. 1981) (holding that a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial may not enter a guilty
plea); Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 398 Mass. 288, 291, 496 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (1987) (incompetent
defendant could not accept guilty plea agreed to by his attorney and guardian ad litem).
143. But see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 182 (1975) (Court stated that a post-trial determination of competency "may have advantages, at least where the defendant is present at the trial and
the appropriate inquiry is implemented with dispatch.").
144. State v. Thompson, 285 N.C. 181, 185-86, 203 S.E.2d 781, 784 (citing State v. Propst, 274
N.C. 62, 69, 161 S.E.2d 560, 566 (1968)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 867 (1974).
145. In Gravette the judge who granted the first order received a large amount of mail from
people objecting to the release. See supra note 22. The custody plans fell through, and the next time
the defense proposed the release, the judge refused. Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus at
4. Judges and district attorneys are elected to their positions in North Carolina and consequently
may be inclined to respond to political pressures. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 7A-60(b), 7A-140 (1989).
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-261 to -277 (1989).
147. Florida has adopted provisions for the outpatient commitment of incompetent defendants.
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justice system will prevent unnecessary state expenditures on evaluations and
will ensure that the state neither hospitalizes nor incarcerates a person who is
incompetent but not dangerous.
The general assembly could make this change by requiring courts to drop
charges against incompetent defendants in certain situations. 148 The current
statute for dismissal of charges against an incompetent defendant provides:
When a defendant lacks capacity to proceed, the court may dismiss the charges:
(1) When it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant will not gain capacity to proceed; or
(2) When the defendant has been substantially deprived of his
liberty for a period of time equal to or in excess of the maximum
permissible period of confinement for the crime or crimes
charged; or
(3) Upon the expiration of a period of five years from the date of
determination of incapacity to proceed in the case of misdemeanor charges and a period of 10 years in the case of felony
charges. 149
The General Assembly should revise the statute to provide the following:
When a defendant lacks capacity to proceed, the court must dismiss the charges:
(1) When the defense shows, by a preponderanceof the evidence,
that the defendant will not become competent to proceed with a
trialin the foreseeablefuture; or
(2) When the defendant has been substantially deprived of his
liberty for a period of time equal to or in excess of the maximum
permissible period of confinement for the crime or crimes
charged; or
(3) Upon the expiration of a period of five years from the date of
determination of incapacity to proceed in the case of misdemeanor charges and a period of 10 years in the case of felony
charges. 150

Amending the statute in this way will provide a means of appeal for incompetent defendants who are not likely to become competent. Because the decision
to drop the charges would no longer be discretionary, a higher court could review the trial judge's refusal to dismiss charges. The statute would provide the
FLA. STAT. § 916.17 (1989); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.219. Unlike North Carolina, Florida distinguishes

between criminal and civil commitments. See FLA. STAT. § 916.13 (1989).
148. Florida law requires the court to dismiss charges against an incompetent defendant in some
situations, without prejudice to bring charges against the defendant if he regains competency. FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.213(a). The court must drop charges after five years for a person facing a felony
charge, or after one year if the person faces a misdemeanor charge, when there is "no substantial
probability" that the defendant will become competent to stand trial. Id. If the defendant meets
commitment criteria, the court will commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, where he will receive treatment through the civil mental health care provisions. Id.
at 3.213(b).
149.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1008 (1988).

150. Italicized portions represent suggested changes.
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trial judge with an evidentiary standard for determining the permanency of the
defendant's incompetent condition. At the same time, the judge's finding of fact
that a defendant will become competent to stand trial would be overturned only
if clearly erroneous, 15 1 thus providing a safeguard if the judge reasonably believes the defendant will regain capacity.
If a statute such as the one suggested in this Note had been in effect while
the state had custody of Robert Gravette, Gravette's attorney could have moved
for a dismissal of the charges once it became apparent that Gravette suffered
from permanent brain damage and probably never would become competent to
stand trial. If the trial court had denied Gravette's request for a dismissal of the
charges, Gravette could have appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals
for relief based on the statute, arguing either that the trial court had found him
permanently incompetent and had erred in refusing to drop the charges or that
the trial court was clearly erroneous in its finding that he would become competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future. Although Gravette still may have
remained confined to jail and mental hospitals if it were not clear that he was
permanently incompetent, he would have had a better chance of obtaining his
release if a statute such as the one suggested had been in place.
Although North Carolina has made substantial improvements in its system
for handling incompetent defendants, the state persists in denying some incompetent defendants' due process rights by leaving criminal charges hanging over
their heads. Pending criminal charges provide courts with authority to limit an
incompetent defendant's freedom for substantial periods of time. In the interests
of both state expenditures and defendants' rights, courts should drop charges
when a defendant will be unable to proceed to trial in the foreseeable future.
Changing the statute to require judges to drop charges when conditions reflect
permanent incompetence could ensure that the state neither imprisons permanently incompetent defendants for lengthy periods of time awaiting competency

nor shuttles them repeatedly to mental institutions for periodic competency
evaluations.
ANN L. HESTER

151. State v. Rogers, 68 N.C. App. 358, 372, 315 S.E.2d 492, 503, disc. rev. denied 311 N.C. 767,
319 S.E.2d 284 (1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1101 (1985).

